The Park Place Economist
Volume 6

Issue 1

Article 13

4-1998

The European Union Monetary Integration
Tom Purl '99
Illinois Wesleyan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace

Recommended Citation
Purl '99, Tom (1998) "The European Union Monetary Integration," The Park Place
Economist: Vol. 6
Available at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol6/iss1/13
This Article is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital
Commons @ IWU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this material in any
way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For
other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights
are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This material
has been accepted for inclusion by faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.

The European Union Monetary Integration
Abstract
The date is 1 January 1999, and for the first time in history the nations of Europe will combine their
economic might to form a monetary union of unparalleled size, diversity, and power. Starting in 1952 with
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and then progressing towards the recently signed Treaty
of Amsterdam, the process of European economic unity has produced two stunning results: constant
economic growth and lasting European peace. With the introduction of the euro as legal tender in 2002,
the final piece of the EU puzzle is in place. The new era of the EU is set to begin characterized by
increased economic development and cooperation within the continent.
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The European Union Monetary Integration
Tom Purl
The date is 1 January 1999, and for the first
time in history the nations of Europe will combine their
economic might to form a monetary union of
unparalleled size, diversity, and power. Starting in
1952 with the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) and then progressing towards the recently
signed Treaty of Amsterdam, the process of European
economic unity has produced two stunning results:
constant economic growth and lasting European peace.
With the introduction of the euro as legal tender in
2002, the final piece of the EU puzzle is in place. The
new era of the EU is set to begin characterized by
increased economic development and cooperation
within the continent.
Of course, this is a prediction, one that most
leaders of the EU would probably like the average
European citizen to believe. However, after
researching the subject, one could not say that this
prediction is very accurate. Today, as the EU is moving
closer to the dates specified for monetary union by the
Maastricht Treaty, we can clearly see that the EU is
still very far away from accomplishing their vision of
constant economic growth and peace. Forty-five years
after the birth of the ECSC, the EU has weathered
economic disasters, high unemployment, popular
skepticism, enlargement problems and fiscal
irresponsibility by member states. However, even with
these numerous problems, the EU member states will
attain their goal of European Monetary Union (EMU)
which will eventually include additional Eastern
European states.
To first analyze the future of the EU, the single
currency, and enlargement, we must look at the theories
of optimal currency areas developed by Robert
Mundell and Ronald McKinnon. The theory of
optimal currency areas describes whether a group of
territories are suitable to share a single currency,
whether that group be a federation like the United
States or independent nations such as in the EU. By
analyzing the monetary units size and makeup, these
two economists developed two nearly opposite theories
to prescribe the best possible area for a single currency.
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Mundell believes that a monetary union should
not be so big that it cannot have a common economic
base throughout. This theory follows the idea that if a
region were too big and had greatly varying industries,
one area could be experiencing an economic boom
while another may be in a recession. In such a
situation, the monetary unions central bank would
have great difficulty trying to devise a single monetary
policy that would benefit the entire region. An EU
example of this would be if the UK was experiencing
an economic boom due to an increased demand for
steel and coal while Germany was experiencing a
recession due to a sharp increase in Albanian refugees
coupled with a taste shift from German to Japanese
automobiles. The European Central Bank (ECB)
would not be able to raise interest rates to avoid
inflation (resulting from the UKs boom) because that
would only augment the economic problems in
Germany, nor could they lower interest rates to help
Germany for the opposite reason.
This problem does not mean that an economic
union as large as the proposed EMU with its widely
varying industries cannot survive, however. The US
economic union does not shut down every time there
is a recession in New England and a boom in the Pacific
Northwest. For a region such as the proposed EU to
run efficiently, it needs internal adjustment
mechanisms to compensate for the varying economic
shocks it will experience.
One of the necessary adjustment mechanisms
is ease of labor mobility. If a resident in Missouri
loses her job as a defense contractor, she should be
able to move to another area of the economic union to
get a similar job with a minimum of obstacles, such as
having to change citizenship. This free flow of labor
would result in an outflow of labor from the area that
is losing jobs and an inflow to the area that is offering
new jobs, providing a way of balancing out varying
economic shocks within an economic union.
Today, the EU does not offer the same level of
labor mobility that is found in the US. For starters,
there are ten different official languages within the EU.
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A doctor in Missouri could move over 1500 miles EU run more efficiently, especially considering that
away and still not have to worry about learning a new the EU heads have a lot more control over fiscal
language, yet a doctor in France would have to learn transfers than they do labor mobility.
German if he moved just 100 miles to work in
McKinnons theory of optimum currency areas
Germany. This would then lead to other cultural is quite different from Mundells. Whereas Mundells
barriers that inhibit labor mobility. No matter where motto might have been go small, McKinnons ideal
you are from and want to go in America, cultural optimum currency area would have to be big to protect
differences would not be as varied compared to say, its standard of living. He believed that if the industrial
Greece and Finland.
base of an economic union were too small, that area
Also, there are strong professional boundaries would have to import too much, meaning that their
towards a freer flow of labor in the EU. Although purchasing power for most necessities would rely
similar circumstances do exist within the US, an greatly on how much the value of their currency
accountant that received his
fluctuates in relation to their
diploma in Wisconsin is able to
trading partners.
work in Illinois. However,
For example, say St. Louis
Professional and culeven though the EU is a
was an economic union with its
tural boundaries
common market, their
own currency. Domestically,
accounting system varies from
they produce military aircraft,
could seriously remember to member. While the
beer, and miscellaneous
strict the free flow of
EU is striving towards common
machine equipment for
standards for such professions
industrial plants. Within a
labor
needed
to
make
as accounting, many guidelines
reasonable range, fluctuations
the
EU
more
efficient
will still be decided by local
of the value of St. Louis
guidance, meaning that
currency would not have a very
and
to
minimize
reinternal differences will still
large impact on the price of its
gional inequalities.
exist (Gallagher and Andrew
domestic products. However,
57-58). These professional and
if the St. Louis currency was
cultural boundaries could
fluctuating wildly with the
seriously restrict the free flow of labor needed to make central Illinois currency where they bought all of their
the EU more efficient and to minimize regional corn and milk, consumers would witness their
inequalities.
purchasing power fluctuate every time they got paid.
Another necessary internal adjustment Such price level instability might result in a loss of
mechanism within the frame of Mundells model is confidence regarding the St. Louis dollar, which could
centralized fiscal transfers. If Italy is experiencing a lead to it losing its function as a stable store of value
recession while France has a booming economy, labor (Dunn and Ingram 523). In this example, there would
mobility may not be sufficiently quick or large enough be a clear advantage in having an economic union large
to cause an equilibrium in the region. Centralized enough to produce most of its own goods that it uses.
fiscal transfers would then aid the poorer region by
So which theory is the right one? Obviously
using some of the increased tax revenues from France the EU cannot be big enough to produce nearly
and apply them towards projects such as welfare for everything it would need while simultaneously being
Italy.
small enough to ensure optimum labor mobility. And
Once again, however, the structure in place there may even be debate over which option is more
for this internal adjustment mechanism is not as strong desirable within the EU power structure itself.
as its US counterpart. Called cohesion funds in the Germany has made their case repeatedly for strict
EU, they are not as large as those in the U.S. federal adherence to the Maastricht convergence criteria while
fiscal system (Caves et al. 604). Even though no making, no secret of their desire for a small euro
plans for increasing these funds exist, these cohesion (EMU) in the first instance (Peet 7). Meanwhile,
funds should be augmented in the future to help the smaller EMU members such as Portugal are eager
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exploit the trade and price level advantages of accession negotiations for Finland, Austria, and
belonging to a full fifteen member EU (Portugal 1997). Sweden only took sixteen months and, unlike previous
So which vision is right for the EU? This enlargements, there were no transitional periods. The
question is hard enough if we were only looking at the EU officially views enlargement as, an investment in
situation economically, but the EU is a unique case. our own future, removing trade barriers which
Politically, the right EU is a large, inclusive EU. As I therefore creates wealth and jobs (Brittan 1997).
have already mentioned, the ECSC was the forefather
It is, however, much easier for the EU to accept
of the EU, being the first multi-state European wealthy, highly developed nations such as Finland and
organization to use a federal governing body (the Austria than it is to accept poor, former soviet satellites
ECSC High Authority) which was composed of such as Poland or Hungary. For example, the three
representatives from the member
recent EU additions had either
countries (France, West
belonged to, or been associated
Germany, Italy, Belgium,
EU leaders will need with, EFTA (European Free
Netherlands, and Luxembourg).
Trade Association) since 1960;
to
consider
making
Although one of the goals
and all had developed
associated with the creation of the
progressively closer relations
enlargement a chief
ECSC was more efficient trade,
with the EU over many years
priority
to
ever
fully
President Jean Monet and French
(Brittan 1997). In contrast, many
Foreign Minister Robert
eastern European nations are just
realize the political
Schumans long term goal was to
now beginning to adjust to freepotential of an ecocreate a structure that uses
market capitalism, an idea that in
economic integration to
some regions is still very new and
nomically unified,
eventually accomplish the
foreign. To add to the difficulties
truly European
political unification of Europe
incurred by eastern European
(European Community: 95,
nations who seek membership in
union.
1997). Freer trade was a plus, but
the EU, there are strict Maastricht
European leaders were also trying
criteria for EMU, which seem
to prevent Germany and France from igniting another barely attainable to many current EU members and
world war. Therefore, the EU has always had the two impossible to non-members.
clear goals: increasing the standard of living through
Also, as witnessed by the recent civil wars in
freer trade and forcing member states to be peaceful the former Yugoslavia and Albania, the EU is not
with one another due to economic integration.
delivering on its original vision of uniting Europe
To improve Europe as a whole, however, the politically through economic integration. Traditional
EU needs to grow so it can be more representative, enemies, such as Germany and France may now be
more accurately European. In its history, the EU friends, but Baltic nations like Serbia, the powder keg
has grown from six members to fifteen, enlarging on for W.W.I, are reliving the same wars they participated
four separate occasions. This enlargement has been in over a century ago. EU leaders will need to consider
difficult, usually resulting in long negotiations and making enlargement a chief priority to ever fully
bitter debates over the EUs role. The UK had to wait realize the political potential of an economically
over ten years to join the EU because of various unified, truly European union.
disagreements over the validity of agreements, such
Finally, the last topic discussed here will be
as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which was the viability of an EU composed of full-fledged EMU
advantageous for France but increased the average members or ins and non-euro using outs. Clearly,
British grocery bill. Disagreements over this policy if EMU is to proceed according to the benchmark dates
led to the vetoing of Britains EU application by established by the Maastricht Treaty, some current EU
President de Gaulle of France in 1963 and the ceasing members will be left out of the first wave of EMU
of renewed negotiations in 1967 (History of UK acceptance (Brittan 1997). This inequality may foster
Membership of the EU, 1997). However, the recent an environment within the two-tiered EU that would
The Park Place Economist / vol. VI
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produce two problems: competitive devaluations
between ins and outs and increased speculative
attacks on outs.
It has already been stated that being a member
of the EU certainly has its advantages. However, many
out members may feel that they are at a disadvantage
compared to the EMUs trading strength, which could
possibly be hurting out industries. In an effort to
achieve an economic advantage, an out country may
decrease the value of its currency against the euro even
though its inflation is no higher than that of the EMU,
resulting in a competitive devaluation. These actions
would hurt in industries because it would make their
goods more expensive relative to the goods of the
country that devalued.
The other problem facing outs in a two-tiered
EU world is speculative attacks. Although speculative
attacks already occur to EU members, the creation of
the EMU will cause new reasons for them to occur.
For example, even after all of the economic and
political sacrifices that have been made by an EU
member, failure to attain EMU status on 1 January
1999 may cause the financial market to believe that
all outs will lose their monetary discipline. For
example, these out nations may believe that since
they dont have to worry about joining the EU for a
while, they can run a bigger deficit to stimulate growth
and be more politically popular. Just the possibility
of this occurrence could launch a speculative attack
on any out country, which would be worsened by
the fact that the ECB has vowed not to bail out any
those countries. These problems may introduce some
added volatility to the future EU.
When analyzing the EUs position as an
optimal currency area, it is important to remember that
no one area is ever going to fit both theories exactly.
No economic union in the world is small enough to
have perfect labor mobility coupled with ability to
produce most of its own products. It is, therefore,
important to look at the EU as a unique case,
examining how well it fits the theories and what policy
changes are planned.
To analyze the EU from McKinnons
perspective, it would make a great optimal currency
area. The members of this large economic union
already receive most of their goods from each other.
Even from Mundells perspective, economic unity is
still a possibility. Labor mobility may look difficult

today, but it is important to remember that
economically integrated international blocs are fairly
new. This new climate may cause many Europeans
to learn skills that would be valuable all over the
continent and most Europeans already know more than
one language. If EU officials enact more laws to
promote mobility while also increasing fiscal transfers
amongst members, the economic union as a whole
could adjust efficiently enough to minimize certain
asymmetric economic shocks.
Next there is the question of enlargement. In
a 1996 speech by Sir Leon Brittan, the vice-president
of the European Commission, he referred to
enlargement as the moral responsibility which history
has challenged us to accept. Officially, the EU wants
to be as Enlargement-friendly as possible, viewing
Maastricht convergence criteria as sound policies that
should be aspired to, rather than hurdles which they
have to jump (Brittan 1997). EU leaders realize the
necessity to enlarge eventually, and there is no reason
to doubt that they will continue to admit qualified
nations well into the next century.
Finally, once again we look at the problems
associated with a two-tiered EU. As far as possible
competitive devaluations taken by outs against the
EMU, there are deterrents already planned for such
actions. For example, if a country participates in such
devaluation, they would receive EU aid in the form of
their native currency, which would be worth less due
to the devaluation. Also, as nations negotiated to
become part of the EU, the all signed up to the broad
economic guidelines, which will ensure that we are
all pursuing the same complementary macroeconomic
policies (Brittan). Regarding speculative attacks, if
an out shows that they are rejecting the EMU and
might participate in competitive devaluations, they will
be ripe for such an attack. In order to defend
themselves, an out will have to continue to run a
sound monetary policy, defending its currency behind
the strength of the euro.
Today, the question is not whether the
European Union will use a single currency. Rather, it
is who will be the first to participate, and where will it
go, and when will others join. Although the process
of European economic integration has lasted over forty
years, it still has plenty of room to grow and change.
Adjustments to the union will need to be made
constantly, striving to maintain peace while steadily
The Park Place Economist / vol. VI
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increasing the standard of living.
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